Boeing flight deck design philosophy by Stoll, Harty
N91-10937
BOEING FLIGHT DECK DESIGN
PHILOSOPHY
Harty Stoll
Boeing Commercial Airplane Company
17








FLIGHT MANAGEMENT COMPUTER & MAP
AUTOMATED MONITORING












FLIGHT DECK DESIGN GOALS
747-400
THE DESIGN OF THE 747 FLIGHT DECK IS BASED ON THE RECENT SUCCESSFUL
757/767 PROGRAMS AS WELL AS ON THE EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM MILLIONS OF
FLIGHT HOURS ON BOEING COMMERCIAL JET TRANSPORTS. SPECIAL EMPHASIS IS
PLACED ON THE LATEST DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND CONTROL/DISPLAY INTEGRATION
TO PROVIDE UNCLUTTERED INSTRUMENT PANELS, IMPROVED REACH AND SCAN
CAPABILITY, AND OPTIMIZED CREW WORKLOAD. THE RESULT IS ENHANCED SAFETY




• IMPROVED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES
• PERFORMANCE/WORKLOAD OPTIMIZATION
• INCREASED RELIABILITY/MAINTAINABILITY
• REDUCED OPERATING COST
• IMPROVED CREW COMFORT
• DIGITAL COMPUTERS/MICROPROCESSORS
• INTEGRATED DISPLAYS
• INTEGRATED FLIGHT MANAGEMENT
• CDU's
• LASER GYRO INERTIAL REFERENCE
• ADVANCED SYSTEM MONITORING
• CENTRAL MAINTENANCE SYSTEM WITH
STANDARDIZED BITE
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FLIGHT DECK DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
INDUSTRY
• AIRLINE INPUT • AIAA
• FAA STUDIES • ARINC
• NASA STUDIES • RTCA
• NTSB • ICAO
• SAERECOMMENDATIONS • ALPA, IFALPA, APA
• ATA • MISC. STUDIES (1969 UAL-ALPA)
• FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION • A S RS
• COMPETITIVE AIRFRAME MANUFACTURE ° MILITARY - AIR FORCE, NAVY, ETC.
• SYMPOSIUMS • HUMAN FACTOR ORGANIZATIONS
• WORKSHOPS
• ACCIDENT/INCIDENT DATA
• BOEING FLIGHT TEST
• CREW TRAINING
• BOEING IR & D
BOEING
• CUSTOMER SERVICE UNIT
• DATA ON EXISTING BOEING MODELS
• RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY





















Jan '78 Jun '79 Jan '80
Base Large Decrease Large Decrease
Base Moderate Increase Small Increase
Base Moderate Decrease Large Decrease





• INERTIAL REFERENCE SYSTEMS
ELECTRONIC FLIGHT INSTRUMENT SYMBOL GENERATION
° AUTOMATIC FLIGHT CONTROL AND FLIGHT DIRECTOR SYSTEM
• ILS RECEIVERS
DUAL
FLIGHT AND ENGINE INSTRUMENTS




• WARNING AND CAUTION ALERTS
AUTOMATION
(WHAT DOES IT MEAN?)
SUBSYSTEM AUTOMATION
REDUCE CREW WORKLOAD (3 TO 2 MAN CREW)
REDUCE CREW ERROR
GLASS COCKPITS












Examples of Accident Data Reviewed
e Subsystem management accidents-worldwide air ca rriers 1968-1980
Accident Related Cause
• Crew omitted pitot heat
• Wrong position of standby power switch
o Flight engineer and captain conducted
unauthorized troubleshooting
• Electrical power switching not coordinated
with pilots
• Flight engineer shut off ground proxlmlty
• Faulty fuel management
• No leading edge flaps on takeoff
• Confusion over correct spoiler switch
position
• Crewman did not follow pilot's Instruction
• Mismanaged cabin pressure
Design
• Auto on with engine start
• Automated standby and essential power
• Simplified systems delete maintenance
functions
• Auto switching and load shedding-no crew
action required
• Shut off on forward panel In full view of both
pilots
• Auto fuel management with alert for low fuel,
wrong configuration, and imbalance
• Improved takeoff warning with digital
computer
• Dual electric spoiler control
• Full-time caution and warning system
• Dual auto system with auto switchover
Allocation of 747-200 Flight Engineer's Duties













































































CREW CAUSED ACCIDENTS VS. AUTOMATION
ALL ACCIDENTS THRU 1988







ATTITUDE, HEADING HOLD, AUTOPILOT
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CREW OVERUSE REDUCING CREW FALL-BACK CAPABILITY
PILOT TRANSITION IN AND OUT OF AUTOMATIC AIRPLANES
BOREDOM
DESIGNER's INTENT NOT TRANSMITTED TO PILOT
.... '"'_- PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
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